A Street-Proofing Guide for Reading the Writing on the Post-Cold War World : A Response to Charles Krauthammer by Bush, Kenneth David
	



		

		
					
	

	
				
 
	

!∀#	∃% &&&∋()		∗+

,−
,		,
	
+
	∗.

(
	
.#	//0.
.	1−
23
			
	
	4	

				

  
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
WAR-MAKING, PEACEKEEPING, AND PEACEBUILDING 
 
Two Views of a Post-Cold War World 
 
 
 
 
Charles Krauthammer, "Peacekeeping is for Chumps," Saturday Night, vol. 110, no. 9 (November 1995) 
 
Kenneth D. Bush and Kevin J. Bush, "A Street-Proofing Guide for Reading the Writing on the Post-Cold War 
World: A Response to Charles Krauthammer"  
 
in Mark Charlton, ed., Cross Currents: International Relations 2
nd
  edn (Scarborough: ITP Nelson, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
1 
 A Street-Proofing Guide for  Reading the Writing on the Post-Cold War World:  
 A Response to Charles Krauthammer  
 
Cross Currents: International Relations, 2
nd
 edn, (Scarborough: ITP Nelson,1999). 
 
Kenneth D. Bush, Queen's University, Kingston 
Kevin J. Bush, Glebe Collegiate Institute, Ottawa 
 
 
 "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means what I choose it 
to mean.  Neither more nor less." 
 "The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things." 
 "The questions is," said Humpty Dumpty, "who is to be master.  That is all." 
 
 -- Lewis Carol, Through the Looking Glass 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Just as parents street-proof their children before allowing them to wander into the streets to play, so should we 
prepare ourselves before wandering into the writing and rambling of commentators on the post-Cold War world.  
If children should be wary about accepting candy from strangers, we should be no less cautious about accepting 
the simplistic assertions and unsubstantiated generalizations offered by neoconservatives and political "realists" 
who argue that, in essence, the world is no different now than during the Peloponnesian War.  Not only are they 
offering up dubious candies, they've got the car door open and are leaning out to offer us a ride.  Don't get in.  
Their descriptions of the world are inaccurate.  Their prescriptions impoverish our political imagination and fail 
to respond to both the challenges and opportunities presented to us in a post-Cold War World.  And most 
dangerously, they are promoting a recipe for ensuring that the world will be a meaner, more precarious, place. 
 
This short chapter has three objectives.  First, it responds to an article by Charles Krauthammer entitled, "Peace-
keeping is for Chumps,"
1
  in an effort to defuse and dispel many of the misconceptions of the post Cold-War 
world promoted by the old boys' club of academics and policy makers -- particularly, though not exclusively, in 
the United States. Second and more importantly, this chapter introduces a simple set of questions that may be 
used as analytical filters to guide a critical reading of explanations of the post- Cold War condition.  Ultimately, 
this chapter seeks to street-proof readers by introducing some basic analytical tools with which to assess the 
merit, general integrity, and trust-worthiness of arguments.  And finally, the article outlines what it sees to be a 
more constructive and effective agenda for building peace in a post-Cold War world.  There is not the space in 
this short chapter to address all of the issues provoked by Krauthammer's article.  This chapter will have served 
its purpose if it provides the tools for the reader to revisit, and re-assess, the original article with new and more 
critical eyes. 
 
Let us be clear about what is not being argued here.  We are not arguing that military force does not have an 
important place in international politics.  The most cursory glance at contemporary international relations 
underscores both the prevalence and perhaps even inevitability of military force in situations where all other 
options have failed, or in situations where the measured and discriminate application of military muscle is needed 
to reinforce non-military measures.  However, this chapter does take issue with those who view, and respond to, 
the world exclusively through the narrow lens of military force.  To respond to the post-Cold War world with a 
policy tool kit limited to the hammer of military might is like tackling a plumbing job with carpenter tools.  One 
might be able to fashion a workable system, but it would be less than optimal, to be sure. 
 
The greatest danger in accepting the militarized programme advocated by Charles Krauthammer and his club is 
this: the use of military force as the first resort, rather than the last resort, and the application of military 
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"solutions" to non-military problems, risks further militarizing the international environment thereby increasing 
rather than decreasing individual and collective security.
2
  As Simon Dalby points out: "formulating social 
problems in terms of security all too easily leads to militarization or violence as a solution to what is defined as a 
problem....  The question then is whether, in the process of extending the ambit of threats requiring a military 
response, one isn't further militarizing society rather than dealing more directly with social problems."
3
 
 
Neither is this chapter arguing that peacekeeping is a silver bullet that will "resolve" the militarized conflicts 
confronting us today.  In some ways, Krauthammer's failure to provide a definition of "peacekeeping" or to use 
the term consistantly thoughout his article, is an accurate reflection of the confusion surrounding peacekeeping 
today.  Although the concept and practice of peacekeeping have attracted significant attention in the post-Cold 
War World, nowhere are these debates acknowledged, let alone engaged, in "Peacekeeping is for Chumps."
4
   
Krauthammer savages "peacekeeping" as "perhaps the most widely accepted illusion at work in today's 
"Utopianism," but fails to define or explain what he means by the term -- traditionally understood to be a strategy 
"to halt and reduce the manifest violence of a conflict through the intervention of military forces in an 
interpository role."
5
  Instead, he finger-points to a wide variety of different instances where the international 
community has sanctioned the deployment of military force.   Some of these are cases of traditional 
peacekeeping; some are examples of what are variously called "second generation peacekeeping," or the "new 
peacekeeping partnership" which involve a large civilian component; and some examples, as he notes, are not 
peacekeeping operations at all.  Yet, all are tarred indiscriminately with the same black brush. 
 
If we are to develop an appreciation of the positive and negative impacts of "peacekeeping" operations, then 
surely the starting point must be an appreciation of the variation in the types of operations and the circumstances 
within which they are launched.  Further, if an article is to make a constructive contribution to the debate 
concerning the role and efficacy of peacekeeping, it has a responsibility to clarify rather than perpetuate such 
confusion in the field.
6
  We need to distinguish between: (1) those instances in which peacekeeping was tried and 
failed; (2) those instances in which peacekeeping was applied in inappropriate conditions; and (3) those instances 
which are more accurately categorized as "peace enforcement" or straight forward military intervention.  Only 
then can we begin to develop a clearer sense of the potential utility and limitations of peacekeeping and other 
forms of military intervention.   
 
As the quote which opens this chapter is meant to suggest, Krauthammer's article illustrates the way in which the 
concept and practice of peacekeeping have been manipulated to serve the particularistic interests of intenational 
political actors to justify unilateral military action.  This is a reflection of a common tendency to focus myopically 
on the military dimensions of international conflict management -- to the neglect of the non-military actors and 
activities that contribute significantly to the peace process.  With this tendency comes the danger that 
peacekeeping may be confused with, or substituted for, the political and diplomatic activities associated with 
peacemaking, and the social, economic and institutional reconstruction activities associated with peacebuilding.  
While Krauthammer is quite correct to point to those instances where military force has been confused for 
peacekeeping, he ignores these non-military components of the peace process which are essential for the 
deconstruction of the structures of war, and the construction of the structures of peace. 
 
However, even "genuine" peacekeeping in the absence of peacemaking and peacebuilding may only succeed in 
imposing an "armed peace," and the removal of peacekeeping troops invites a return to a nasty status quo ante 
bellum.  In other words, while peacekeeping may contribute to the management of the conflict (by inhibiting 
direct military violence), it does not on its own facilitate resolution.  Indeed, in the absence of supporting 
initiatives, peacekeeping may inhibit parties from moving towards peaceful accommodation -- by isolating 
communities, freezing an unsettled status quo, and building barriers between groups.  At best, peacekeeping can 
create a temporary space within which antagonists have the opportunity to engage in dialogue and hopefully in 
"peacemaking."   At worst, it might only provide a short respite before the re-engagement of militarized violence 
by well rested and re-armed troops.
7
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Just as it is naive to expect peacekeeping to be a silver bullet, so is it a mistake to expect the war-making blue 
print of Krauthammer to be a constructive response to our global ills.  Indeed, the acceptance and application of 
such an approach may go a long way to ensuring that the mistakes of the past are continued into the future.  
However, in the comparison of the efficacy of peacekeeping versus war-making, we should bear in mind the fact 
that in 1992 the world's total military budget was $815 billion, compared with a UN peacekeeping budget of $1.9 
billion.
8
  It is truely baffling to try to understand Krauthammer's unqualified statement that "war-making works" 
(p. 76) whether in Bosnia or elsewhere if we acknowledge the deaths of 250,000 people, and the displacement of 
2.7 million people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
9
  Of course, he is making a fine distinction between their war-
making and our war-making, as if it makes a difference to a victim whether a bomb is dropped by NATO forces, 
Bosnian forces, or by generic "men in uniform."  But even if it was possible to discriminate between civilians and 
non-civilians in militarized conflicts, the fundamental problem remains: it is not possible to resolve social, 
political, or economic problems with military solutions.
10
 
 
History is not "just one damn thing after another"; that is, we are not simply propelled by external forces, willy 
nilly.  Occasionally, there are conjunctures in human history when our potential to affect wide spread and lasting 
constructive change increases.  Unfortunately, we often only see these conjunctures in retrospect.  It behooves us 
to ask whether we are in such a position today. 
 
CRITICAL TOOLS 
 
There are a number "filters" that may help us to critically assess the strength of arguments and the quality of 
reasoning applied to the explanation or understanding of a specific issue, event, or decision.  In most cases, some 
of these filters are employed intuitively in our reading and thinking.  But by identifying them explicitly, they may 
be more effectively applied to the systematic assessment of arguments.  For an argument to withstand 
independent, critical, assessment, it must be able to respond to the following questions to the readers' satisfaction: 
1) So what?;  2) Can you prove it?;  and 3) Now what?  Each question suggests a host of further sub-questions 
which help us both to defuse and dismantle shaky arguments, and to construct well-reasoned ones.   
 
So What? 
 
Arguments, like theories, are "always for someone and for some purpose."
11
  The question, "so what?" invites us 
to put an argument into the broader context of the political world and competing ideas: 
 
 What is being figured out, settled, or solved?  What is the author attempting to understand?  
What does it matter?  Who cares?  Whose interests are served, protected, advanced, or 
compromised by the argument?  What is the article doing?  Why is it doing it?  What are the 
implications and consequences of the argument?  What are the implications of the author's 
argument?  Does the argument make sense?    Are the assumption, preconceptions, or 
presuppositions underpinning the argument transparent and reasonable? 
 
Can you Prove It? 
 
This question invites us to consider the degree to which an argument substantiates its analysis or 
recommendations empirically or logically.  When we begin to seek evidence supporting an argument, we are 
better able to distinguish the empirical from the ideological: 
 
 What empirical evidence or detail is offered to substantiate the argument?  How accurate is the 
data, information, or evidence?  What are its sources?  How can we check validity?  Are 
specific examples given?  Are they appropriate?  Are details missing?  Are the complexities of 
the issues understood?  How does the the argument present causes and effects?  Does this make 
  
 
 
4 
sense?  Is the argument reasonable?  Do inferences and interpretations lead directly to the stated 
"conclusions," given the evidence?  What (whose) point of view is taken? Could things be 
otherwise?  Are alternative and competing understandings or arguments recognized, addressed, 
and presented fairly?  What is missing from the argument? 
 
Now What? 
 
Of each of the three sets of questions posed here, this one tends to be the most neglected, particularly in the 
academic setting: 
 
 Does the argument give us an idea of where we might go from here, for example, in terms of 
ideas, theories, policies or concrete actions?  Does it make the leap from critique to the 
development of a practical plan of action?  Does it provide alternative courses of action to 
change negative structures or processes, or to nurture or construct new ones? 
 
There is not the space to apply each of these questions systematically to "Peacekeeping is for Chumps."  
However, with these of questions in mind, we may focus our attention on the article and make a number of 
observations and assessments. 
 
 
READING BETWEEN THE LINES 
 
 Marx said that all great events in world history reappear in one fashion or another, the first 
time as tragedy, the second time as farce.  And I would add: the third time as hallucination (p. 
73) 
 
Charles Krauthammer finds himself in curious political company with his reference to Karl Marx's 18th Brumaire 
of Louis Bonaparte.  In his rush to get to his cute punch line ("the third time as hallucination"), Krauthammer 
misses Marx's central point: "The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare of the brain of the 
living.  And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that 
has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of  revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the 
past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of 
world history in this time honoured disguise and this borrowed language."  Ironically, Krauthammer's 
"Peacekeeping is for Chumps" is a fine example of the point made by Marx.  As we shall see in the section 
below, Krauthammer appears unable to move from the intellectual straight jacket of the Cold War to view the 
present as a new and different world.  I once heard an aboriginal American bend Marx's aphorism in a way which 
is both true to the original text and especially appropriate in the current context: "those who repeat their history 
are bound to remember it."   
 
 
 It is important for us to recognize that the post-Cold War world is not new.  It is as old as the 
international system. The reality of that system is that peace depends, as it has since the 
Peloponnesian Wars, on balance of power.  And the structure of the world being what it is 
today, with the United States overwhelmingly dominant, that means American power, and the 
will to use it.  (p. 76) 
 
A well-reasoned argument is a process by which an author leads the reader progressively through a series of 
points to a final, common, conclusion.  It is a process of persuasion which attempts to convince the reader that the 
world is, in fact, as it is portrayed in the text.  As we are invited into this process, we should be sensitive to subtle 
and not-so-subtle coercive rhetorical techniques that might be employed.  For example, in the passage above, we 
should pay attention to the use of the phrase, "the reality of that system" for it represents an attempt to manoeuvre 
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the reader into believing that he/ she is seeing the world "as it is," rather than as it has been packaged and 
presented by Krauthammer.  This is a form of rhetoric which conjures up impressions of objectivity and 
detachment, and thus may obscure the ideological and subjective dimensions of the representations.
12
  Cruder 
versions of rhetorical coersion are evident in the form of the simple statement and restatement of the principal 
assumption of the article, in place of argumentation or empirical substantiation -- namely that "the natural state of 
the world is not perpetual peace but perpetual conflict."  However, this argument loses much of its vigour, if we 
challenge this assumption with the more plausible (and empirically verifiable) position that the "natural state of 
the world" is neither perpetual peace or perpetual conflict exclusively, but some shifting combination of both.  If 
we accept this position, then our analytic lens broadens to enable us to recognize patterns of both international 
cooperation and conflict over time, and in different places and issue areas. 
 
One of the reasons that Krauthammer and his ilk are incapable of even considering a cooperative realm of 
international relations is their very narrow, and increasingly disconnected, conception of power.  Like all die-hard 
Cold Warriors, they are unable to see that the nature of power is changing fundamentally in the post-Cold War 
World.  Such a recognition would challenge one of the central assertions of his argument: that the only currency 
of value in the international arena is military "power." 
 
The argument concerning the changing nature of international power has been made forcefully by Joseph Nye.
13
  
The traditional indicators of power have changed.  They are no longer limited to the size of army, population, 
territory, natural resources, and so on.  More significant are factors such as technology, education, and economic 
clout.  This general diffusion of power leads Nye to adopt a differentiated view of power: "Although both 
bipolarity and multipolarity are useful terms, today, different spheres of world politics have different power 
structures.  Military power, particularly nuclear, remains largely bipolar in its distribution.  But in trade... power is 
multipolar.  Ocean resources, money, space, shipping and airlines each have somewhat different distributions of 
power."
14
 
 
The power of states varies, as does the significance of nonstate actors in different spheres.  Very importantly, as 
world politics has been fragmented into different spheres, military power resources have become less fungible, 
i.e., less transferable from sphere to sphere.  The fact that the United States is the Mike Tyson of the 21st Century 
does not, on its own, give it extra clout in its trade negotiations with states that are more vigorous and robust 
economically.  Indeed, because the use of military force has become increasingly costly (economically and 
politically), less threatening forms of power have grown increasingly attractive.  As Nye notes, "diminished 
fungibility means that specifying the context is increasingly important in estimating the actual power that can be 
derived from power resources -- Power for What?"
15
  As the instruments of power change, so should strategies.  
Nye realizes this.  Krauthammer does not. 
 
Both the diffusion and the changing nature of international power point to a world which is becoming 
increasingly complex.  A one-dimensional understanding of the world, based on a narrow focus on military 
conflict misrepresents the post-Cold War condition.  This is certainly not to suggest that we should abandon 
military institutions or the traditional concerns of the military balance of power.  Rather, it is a call to reject 
simplistic views of the post-Cold War condition, and to recognize the complexity of an international system 
which contains both elements of militarized competition and conflict, as well as elements of cooperation.  
Traditionalists such as Krauthammer seek in vain for "security" through the intimidation which characterizes the 
military balance of power, either oblivious of, or dismissive of, the fact that international actors themselves 
increasingly recognize that emerging threats to "global security" are beyond the control of any single actor, e.g., 
environmental threats, epidemiological threats such as HIV/AIDS, economic volatility/ crisis, arms trafficking, 
illicit drugs, terrorism, and the international migration.
16
   This recognition has led to significant levels of 
international cooperation.
17
  With the expansion of NATO, we are also seeing considerable efforts to develop 
cooperative arrangements within traditional security arenas as well -- between East and West, no less.  A one-
dimensional, militaristic, view of the world ignores, and may even threaten, established and evolving cooperative 
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relationships in these arenas.  Conversely, cooperative initiatives in these other realms may have beneficial 
pacifying effects in military security arenas.
18
 
 
Such cooperation is premised on equal portions of self-interest and common interest.  This is a far cry from the 
so-called "Utopianism" that Krauthammer seems to bite on like a piece of tin foil.  He uses the term to refer to: 
"an era marked by the belief that peace is the norm, that peace is something to be kept, that all it requires is for 
the unrulies of the world to be civilized by compromise and reason, Western style, and that we do this with talk -- 
Vance-Owen plans, UN resolutions -- and blue helmets" (p. 76).  The counter-position presented in 
"Peacekeeping is for Chumps," may be labelled ostrich-ism (not to be confused with ostracism) -- a position 
characterized by the refusal to recognize changes in behaviour which might challenge one's intellectual/ 
ideological position.  A wide range of techniques may be used to plant one's head firmly in the sand, including 
the two evident here: the caricaturization and ignoring of alternative positions.  
 
 
It is estimated that from 1945 to 1989, 23 million children, women, and men have died as a result of 138 wars.
19
  
There is no doubt that the post-Cold War world continues to be a violent, militarized, place.  Indeed, in many 
instances, contemporary militarized violence is a direct consequence of the superpower rivalry that defined the 
Cold War.
20
  One need only review the pattern of arms trafficking to see that the past is very much evident in the 
present.  We see that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council provide 86 per cent of the arms 
exported to developing countries, and that in 1992, as the world searched for the mythical "peace divident," the 
United States alone accounted for 46 per cent of the delivery of weapons to these states.
21
  In Krauthammer-style 
arguments, the supply and demand for such weapons are necessary because the international system is inherently 
conflictual.  The insidiousness of the logic underpinning this argument lies in its potential to become self-
fulfilling.  An alternative assessment which is equally (if not more) plausable, views the supply and demand of 
such weapons to be the cause rather than a consequence of a conflictual world.  The counter-argument that "guns 
don't kill, people do," is as feable at the international level as it is at the domestic American level. 
 
Clearly there are threads of continuity linking the past and the present (for better and for worse).  Importantly, 
decisions and actions undertaken today may either reinforce or sever these threads.  However, there is also 
discontinuity between the past and present.  While being careful not to ignore the legacy of the Cold War,  we 
must also recognize that there we are seeing fundamental changes that offer the possibility of moving out of the 
dark shadow of the past. 
 
 
NOW WHAT?
22
 
 
There are certainly times when conditions are not right for international military intervention, whether in the form 
of peacekeeping, peace "enforcement," or war-making.   However, once it has been decided by international, 
national and domestic actors that a large scale "mission for peace"
23
 (including a military component) is required 
and possible, the following considerations should be borne in mind.   
 
Division of Labour
24
 
 
The number and complexity of tasks involved in peacebuilding and reconstruction will require the energies and 
resources of a multiplicity of actors.  The working relationship between these actors must be premised on a clear 
division of labour which recognizes and harnesses the comparative advantages and particular skill sets of the 
respective actors.  Particular types of actors are better suited to play particular roles.  Thus, peacekeeping is best 
undertaken by military actors; peacemaking and preventive diplomacy are best tackled by formal political actors 
and organizations -- including political leaders, statesmen, and recognized and accepted leaders of the groups 
involved in a conflict; and peacebuilding falls most clearly within the purview of governmental development 
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agencies, some multilateral actors such as the UNDP, as well as NGOs and community organizations.  Thus, 
within this division of labour the military should not be expected to play a development role effectively, just as 
development NGOs should not be expected to play a peacekeeping role.  This is not to suggest that the activities 
associated with these roles are not at times interdependent.  However, they are not inter-changeable.  
 
In order to understand the success or failure of specific efforts at peacebuilding and political, economic, and 
social reconstruction, we need to examine how these different actors and activities interact to support or undercut 
each other.  While there are clear military security tasks that are best undertaken by military actors in the 
immediate post-conflict setting, it is a mistake to cast military activities as the cardinal referent from which all 
other activities take their bearing.  As demonstrated by the case of international intervention in Somalia, to do so 
may jeopardize peace and reconstruction efforts.  Jan Eliasson, the UN Under Secretary General for 
Humanitarian Affairs, observed in July 1993 that in Somalia the international community "was spending ten 
dollars on military protection for every dollar of humanitarian assistance," and that "unless sufficient funds [were] 
provided for rehabilitation activities, there [was] a risk that the military operation can be perceived as an end in 
itself,"
25
  Fundamentally, the rebuilding of war-torn societies is a developmental initiative with a crucial security 
component, rather than the other way around.  While the military security dimension should not be neglected, the 
prospects for longer-term development are compromised to the extent that it is dominated by a military security 
logic.  A very important step towards institutionalizing this developmental position is evident in the recent release 
of the final report of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) DAC Task Force on 
Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation entitled, "Policy Guidelines for Development Cooperation in 
Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Cooperation."
26
   
 
In many ways, the modis operandi of peacekeeping and other military interventions run contrary to most 
approaches to sustainable development.  Peacekeeping and miliary intervention minimizes local inputs and places 
a priority on the self-sufficiency of soldiers; development approaches tend to maximize local inputs and build on 
local resources.  The military brings with it the material and human resources for its anticipated job; development 
actors attempt to develop state and community capacities to identify problems and formulate solutions.  A 
peacekeeping/ military approach is task-oriented, short-term and dependent on high institutional support; a 
development approach is process-oriented, long-term, and minimally dependent on institutional support. 
 
The point to be emphasized here is that while soldiers have an important role to play in the military dimension of 
the peace and reconstruction process, their institutional structure and modis operandi are designed for specific 
functions.  In an already militarized situation, a trained and disciplined military force is essential for some tasks in 
the first stages of de-militarization -- for example the decommissioning of arms; demobilization of soldiers; and 
de-mining.
27
  Also, the contributions of military engineers in the areas of logistics and infrastructural construction 
in the immediate post-conflict setting are sometimes invaluable.  This is where the military's talents are best used. 
 However, the military does not possess the necessary skill set to play effective non-military roles.  Further, as 
argued above, the use of military actors in non-military roles, risks "militarizing" international efforts. 
 
Avoid the temptations of "Bungee Cord Humanitarianism"
28
 
 
Bungee jumping is an adventure sport which involves tying a long bungee cord -- a thick elastic band -- to the 
ankles of a person who then dives head first off a very high platform.  As the bungee cord expands and contracts, 
the participant's body is yanked up and down in a series of progressively less extreme drops.  In the end, the 
participant ends up hanging upside down rather ignobly before being lowered earthwards.  While the participant 
experiences the thrill of having jumped in and out of the jaws of death, in the end, he or she has not made a 
noticeable difference in the world. 
 
An emphasis on "rapid reaction," and "minimal time commitment" increases the danger that bungee jumping 
might become an appropriate metaphor for so-called peacebuilding initiatives.  This appears to have been the 
central logistical concern in the discussion surrounding the modalities of the multinational force for Zaire, and it 
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is certainly a feature of the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
29
  The problem 
with quick in-and-out operations is that their emphasis on rapidity and short term commitment is antithetical to 
the cumulative approach and long-term commitment required for peacebuilding -- if we are to use the term 
"peacebuilding" in any reasonable sense of the term.  Academics, multilateral agencies, NGOs and governments 
all have a responsibility to avoid, and actively discourage, what might be called bungee cord humanitarianism. 
 
Identification, Support and Harnessing of Indigenous Peacebuilding Resources 
 
There is a need to invert the dominant understanding of, and approach to, peacebuilding during and after violent 
conflicts.  Instead of being top-down, externally driven exercises, they need to be internally driven and 
indigenously controlled approaches that draw on and cultivate those indigenous resources necessary for war-torn 
societies to build their own peace, with their own hands.  This type of bottom-up approach is likely to be more 
sustainable and cost-effective in the long-term.  However, it also tends to go against the political grain of the 
standard modis operandi of governments and multilateral organizations.  The adoption of a bottom-up approach 
would require external actors to forfeit considerable control over the process, and to assume a supporting rather 
than starring role in a production which may have significant salience in the domestic  political arena.  While, 
some work has been undertaken in this field, much more work needs to be done in the systematic identification 
and assessment of indigenous peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts. 
 
If, as external actors, we are to facilitate and support indigenous peacebuilding initiatives, we must first know 
what partnership opportunities exist.  Thus, it would be useful to develop the means of identifying and mapping 
those peacebuilding potentials, opportunities and resources within a society that might be supported externally.  
This suggestion rests on the understanding that building peace requires both the deconstruction of the structures 
and processes of violence, as well as the construction of the structures and processes of peace.  The ability to 
systematically map peacebuilding capacities in conflict prone areas is an essential requirement for moving 
beyond ad hoc, reactive, measures.  "Early warning" mechanisms may be helpful for monitoring the 
disintegration of political, legal, social and economic structures that increase the likelihood of violent conflict.  
Equally important however, is the ability to recognize and support those indigenous resources that may contribute 
to conflict prevention, peacebuilding and reconstruction.
30
 
 
Seek to Create Opportunities, Not to Impose "Solutions" 
 
This caveat might be the most obvious, and the most overlooked: rebuilding wartorn societies is not about the 
imposition of "solutions" -- military or otherwise; it is about the creation of opportunities.  That is, from an 
international vantage point, the challenge of rebuilding wartorn societies is to nurture and create the political, 
economic, and social space, within which indigenous actors can identify, develop, and employ the resources 
necessary to build a peaceful, just, and prosperous society.  The desired outcome is rarely a return to the status 
quo ante bellum. Indeed, in most cases, the status quo ante is not a desirable state of affairs to the extent that it 
entails conditions, structures and processes which are implicated in creating the existing condition of violence.  In 
most cases, years of violent conflict and profound changes in the local and international conditions have 
destroyed any chance of returning to a status quo which may (or may not) have existed.  Thus, the ultimate 
objective is the creation of a new basis for peaceful coexistence.  The end point is not a conflict-free utopia, but a 
society in which conflict may be dealt with non-violently as it arises through sustainable, indigenous, structures 
and processes. 
 
The critical tools presented and applied (albeit briefly) above are as appropriate for assessing the current chapter 
as they are for assessing Krauthammer's article.  The point of this discussion is not limited to critique -- as 
necessary and satisfying as this may be.  This chapter seeks to take one step beyond critique, into the realm of 
possibility, whereby we might begin to fashion a different future based on a critical understanding of the 
constraints and opportunities of the past and present.  It is perhaps appropriate to conclude with another, lesser-
know quote from Marx's 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte which speaks to the present as much as it did to the 
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time in which it was written: "The social revolution of the 19th Century cannot draw its poetry from the past, but 
only from the future.  It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped off all superstition in regard to the past."  
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